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 IMMUNITY RATIONE PERSONAE OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHER TOPICS: 
THE SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
 
108 American Journal of International Law (forthcoming 2014) 
 
By Sean D. Murphy∗ 
 
 The International Law Commission held its sixty-fifth session in Geneva from May 6 to 
June 7 and from July 8 to August 9, 2013, under the chairmanship of Bernd H. Niehaus (Costa 
Rica).1 The Commission devoted most of the sixty-fifth session to discussing three topics: 
immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction; subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties; and protection of persons in the 
event of disasters. Notably, the Commission adopted three draft articles and commentary 
identifying three senior governmental officials as entitled to immunity ratione personae from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction – heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers – for 
their public or private acts, an immunity that ceases once they leave office. 
Work also continued on four other topics already on the Commission’s current program 
of work (identification of customary international law, provisional application of treaties, the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute, and the most-favored-nation clause), while new topics on 
protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts and on protection of the atmosphere 
                                                          
∗ Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University, and member of the U.N. 
International Law Commission. My thanks to Josh Doherty (J.D./M.A. ’14) and Anthony Kuhn (J.D./M.A. ’15) in 
preparing this essay. 
1 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 2, para. 4 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Report]. 
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were added to the program. At the prior (sixty-fourth) session, the Commission had adopted 
thirty-two draft articles, together with commentaries, on the topic of expulsion of aliens, and is 
awaiting the comments and observations of governments on those draft articles to be submitted 
by 2014.2 Therefore, that topic was not addressed at the sixty-fifth session. 
 
I.  IMMUNITY OF STATE OFFICIALS FROM FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
 
During its sixty-fifth session, the Commission continued3 its consideration of the 
immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction by discussing the second report of 
the special rapporteur, Concepción Escobar Hernández (Spain).4 The special rapporteur has 
indicated that “owing to the difficult and sensitive nature of the topic, it seems more appropriate 
to begin with lex lata considerations and, at a later date, to consider whether it is necessary and 
possible to formulate proposals de lege ferenda.”5 Further, she intends to maintain the distinction 
between immunity ratione personae (status-based immunity) and immunity ratione materiae 
(functional immunity).6  
The second report proposed six draft articles, which were reworked and consolidated in 
the course of the sixty-fifth session, resulting in the preliminary adoption of three draft articles. 
Draft article 1 indicates the intended scope of the draft articles as follows: 
 
                                                          
2 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fourth Session, U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 11–83, paras. 45–46 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Report]; see also Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of 
Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth Session of the International Law Commission, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 164, 
164–68 (2013). 
3 For its prior work, see Murphy, supra note 2, at 169–71. 
4 International Law Commission, Second Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661 (Apr. 4, 2013) (prepared by special rapporteur Concepción Escobar Hernández) 
[hereinafter Second Report on Immunities]. 
5 Id. at 3, para. 7. 
6 Id. at 15–17, paras. 47–53. 
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Article 1:  Scope of the present draft articles 
 1. The present draft articles apply to the immunity of State officials from the 
criminal jurisdiction of another State. 
 
2. The present draft articles are without prejudice to the immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction enjoyed under special rules of international law, in particular by persons 
connected with diplomatic missions, consular posts, special missions, international 
organizations and military forces of a State.7    
 
 The term “officials” at some point will require clarification, as there is a wide range of 
persons who might be considered officials of a state;8 consequently a footnote was placed next to 
that word as a placeholder. The phrase “from the criminal jurisdiction of another State” signals 
that the draft articles do not address the immunity of state officials either from their own state’s 
criminal jurisdiction or from the criminal jurisdiction of international courts.9 While the draft 
articles address immunity from criminal jurisdiction, they do not yet define what is meant by 
“criminal jurisdiction.” The general understanding, however, is that such jurisdiction “should be 
understood as meaning the set of acts linked to judicial processes whose purpose is to determine 
the criminal responsibility of an individual, including coercive acts that can be carried out 
against persons enjoying immunity in this context.”10 The Commission is not expected to address 
any requirements or limitations arising under international law with respect to such jurisdiction; 
hence, a lack of immunity by itself will not mean that a State is required to exercise criminal 
                                                          
7 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 52, para. 49 (footnote excluded). 
8 Id. at 53–54, para. 49. 
9 Id. at 54, para. 49. 
10 Id. 
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jurisdiction. Further, it seems likely that the draft articles will not preclude a state from according 
greater immunity than the articles require, just as regimes on sovereign immunity set a baseline 
of immunity that must be accorded without prejudice to the provision of greater immunities 
under national law.11 
Paragraph 2 of draft article 1 leaves untouched by these draft articles specialized 
immunity regimes, including immunities granted to special missions and to military forces and 
their civilian component. To ensure preservation of the full range of immunities accorded under 
such regimes, paragraph 2 contains a sweeping reference to “special rules” (thereby recognizing 
rules arising by treaty or custom), followed by a non-exclusive listing of regimes. Further, the 
broad reference to “persons connected with” those regimes is intended to acknowledge that a 
range of persons (including family members) may fall within the scope of such regimes.12  
 The special rapporteur proposed a draft article containing definitions for “criminal 
jurisdiction”, “immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction”, “immunity ratione personae”, and 
“immunity ratione materiae.”13 Several members questioned the need for defining “criminal 
jurisdiction,” given that other regimes addressing immunity saw no need to do so in their 
definitions, including the Vienna conventions on diplomatic and consular relations.14 Other 
members saw utility in a definition, so as to clarify whether certain types of governmental action 
constitute an exercise of criminal jurisdiction. For example, does the “criminal jurisdiction” of a 
state include an order from that state compelling testimony in a criminal proceeding by a foreign 
official who is not a party in the case? Although it may not happen often, state officials can be 
                                                          
11 See, e.g., U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, annex, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States]. 
12 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 55–58, para. 49. 
13 Second Report on Immunities, supra note 4, at 11–17, paras. 36–53. 
14 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 1, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations art. 1, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
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ordered by courts to testify in criminal proceedings, as arose in Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, where a French court had issued a summons to the Djiboutian 
head of state and senior Djiboutian officials. In that instance, the French court’s summons with 
respect to the head of state was merely an invitation to testify, which the president of Djibouti 
could “freely accept or decline”, and therefore the Court found that the summons did not 
transgress the Djiboutian head of state’s immunity.15 The implication, however, was that if the 
summons had been compulsory, then head of state immunity would have been at issue, even 
though the state official was not a defendant in the case. Other possible definitions also 
encountered difficulty within the Commission; for example, members were unsure of the utility 
of defining “immunity ratione personae,” insofar as the operative draft articles themselves 
would clarify what is meant by the term, and any discrepancy between a definition and the 
substantive articles could lead to confusion. Ultimately, the drafting committee decided not to 
send back to the plenary a revised draft article on definitions until further along in the project. 
 Draft article 3 commences the treatment of immunity ratione personae and addresses 
which officials should receive such immunity.  It reads: 
 
Article 3:  Persons enjoying immunity ratione personae 
 
Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity 
ratione personae from the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction.16 
 
                                                          
15 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. REP. 177, para. 171 (June 
4). 
16 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 58, para. 49. 
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In crafting this provision, the Commission essentially considered three options: 
recognizing such immunity for just the head of state and probably the head of government; 
recognizing such immunity for the so-called “troika” (head of state, head of government and 
minister for foreign affairs); and recognizing such immunity for a range of senior government 
officials, including the troika.17  
The first option had the benefit of aligning the immunity closely to individuals who 
personify the state itself, from which the immunity flows. Nevertheless, the option had very little 
support within the Commission. Instead, most members asserted that the immunity extended to 
foreign ministers as well, principally for two reasons:  recognition of the important status of the 
foreign minister in relevant international instruments; and the prior provision of such immunity 
to foreign ministers by international courts and tribunals when cases arose.18 With respect to 
international instruments, recognition that a foreign minister’s representative functions 
approximate those of the head of state may be seen instruments such as the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties,19 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,20 the Convention on Special 
Missions,21 the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with 
International Organizations of a Universal Character,22 and, perhaps implicitly, in the United 
                                                          
17 Id. at 58–65, para. 49. 
18 Id. at 60–62, para. 49. 
19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 7(2)(a), May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) 
(hereinafter VCLT). 
20 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents art. 1.1(a), Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. 
21 Convention on Special Missions art. 21, Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231. 
22 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a 
Universal Character art. 50, Mar. 14, 1975, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.67/16 (1975). 
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Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.23 Indeed, “it is a 
well-established rule of international law that the Head of State, the Head of Government and the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs are deemed to represent the State merely by virtue of exercising 
their functions.”24  Inclusion of foreign ministers in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons is notable in that, when the 
Commission drafted that convention, it chose not to include the minister for foreign affairs in the 
list of persons internationally protected, but governments decided to add that official to the final 
text of the Convention.25 
 As for case law, many Commission members noted that the International Court, in the 
Arrest Warrant case, asserted that “it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular 
agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of 
Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, 
both civil and criminal.”26 Indeed, the immunity of a sitting foreign minister from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction was precisely the issue in that case. As for national courts, in its 
commentary the Commission stated:  
 
that while there are very few rulings on the immunity ratione personae from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction of the Head of Government and almost none in respect of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the national courts that have had occasion to comment on 
                                                          
23 Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States arts. 3.2, 2.1(a)(iv), supra note 11(art. 3.2 addressing heads of 
state and art. 2.1(a)(iv) arguably including the other two categories of officials within the concept of “representatives 
of the State”). 
24 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 
I.C.J. REP. 6, , para. 46 (Feb. 3). 
25 See 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 60–61, para. 49. 
26  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. REP. 3, para. 51 (Feb. 14); see also 
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 14, para. 170. 
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this subject have nevertheless always recognized that those high-ranking officials do have 
immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction during their term of office.27 
 
Though the Commission did not cite academic commentary in support of this proposition, it 
appears that many scholars take the position that immunity ratione personae extends to the 
troika. 28 
 The more difficult question was whether the immunity should extend beyond the troika to 
other senior government officials. In this regard, the Arrest Warrant judgment suggested a 
broader ambit than just the troika, for the language quoted above pointed to “certain holders of 
high-ranking office in a State, such as” the troika.29 Under the influence of that statement, some 
scholars have maintained that immunity ratione personae extends beyond the troika.30 Yet given 
that the only official at issue in the Arrest Warrant case was a foreign minister, any language 
suggesting a broader ambit was dicta. In national courts, there is no conclusive outcome; some 
courts have accorded immunity ratione personae to other government officials, while some 
courts have not. In some instances, the basis for the court’s decision, one way or the other, is 
unclear or ambiguous; a denial of immunity might be because the official falls outside the troika 
or might be because he or she falls outside the circle of “high-ranking” officials.  
                                                          
27 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 62, para. 49. 
28 See, e.g., Rémy Prouvèze, Immunities, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 355, 360 
(William Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011); ANNYSSA BELAL, IMMUNITÉS ET VIOLATIONS GRAVES DES DROITS 
HUMAINS: VERS UNE ÉVOLUTION STRUCTURELLE DE L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL? 155–157 (2011); 
ALVARO BORGHI, L’IMMUNITÉ DES DIRIGEANTS POLITIQUES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 541 (2003). 
29 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 26, at 20–21, para. 51. 
30 See, e.g., PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 73-75 (2013); JAMES 
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 500 (8th ed. 2012); Chanaka 
Wickremasinghe, Immunities Enjoyed By Officials of States and International Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 380, 401 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010); ROBERT KOLB, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PÉNAL 202-203 (2008); 
Paolo Palchetti, Some Remarks on the Scope of Immunity of Foreign State Officials in the Light of Recent Judgments 
of Italian Courts, 19 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 83, 85 (2009). 
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For example, a U.K. court in 2004 held that the Israeli defense minister was entitled to 
immunity ratione personae with respect to an arrest warrant stemming from allegations of 
committing grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The judge expressly stated: “today 
I conclude that a Defence Minister would automatically acquire State immunity in the same way 
as that pertaining to a Foreign Minister.”31 In the 2011 Khurts Bat case, a U.K. court declined to 
extend personal immunity to the head of the executive office of Mongolia’s national security 
council, who was sought for extradition on charges of committing abduction and serious bodily 
injury. The court declined to do so not because the official fell outside of the troika but, because 
of his insufficiently high rank, he fell outside of a circle of officials who are able to avail 
themselves of immunity ratione personae.32 U.S. courts have not addressed the issue in the 
criminal context, but in civil cases have declined to extend immunity ratione personae in 1987 to 
the Philippines’ solicitor general,33 in 2003 to Pakistan’s minister of agriculture,34 and in 2013 to 
certain Cameroonian officials other than Cameroon’s President, including the “Secretary of State 
for the Defense in charge of National Gendarmerie.”35 
 After reviewing such cases, and noting that senior government officials in any event can 
benefit from special missions immunity when they are on official visits,36 the Commission 
ultimately elected to restrict immunity ratione personae to the troika. At some point the 
Commission may need to consider whether family members or other persons within the 
“entourage” of a troika official are also protected by the immunity, on a theory that their 
                                                          
31 Re Mofaz, [2004] 128 I.L.R. 709, 712 (Eng.).   
32 Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2029 [61]  (Eng.). 
33 Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797–98 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
34 I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
35 Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 6:12-cv-1415-TC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25424, at *3–6 (D. Oregon Jan. 
25, 2013) (extending immunity ratione personae to the president based on a suggestion of immunity from the U.S. 
government); Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 6:12-cv-1415-TC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83948, at *3, 16–21 
(D. Oregon May 16, 2013) (extending immunity ratione materiae to the other defendants). 
36  2013 Report, supra note 1, at 65. 
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protection is also needed to achieve the object and purpose of the immunity. The memorandum 
prepared by the Commission’s Secretariat in 2008 discussed this issue, pointing to several 
national statutes where family members and others were granted immunity ratione personae as 
well.37 In the United States there is precedent for such immunity the civil context; a U.S. court in 
a civil suit in 1988 extended immunity ratione personae to the wife of the president of Mexico, 
by virtue of her relationship to Mexico’s president.38 
Draft article 4 addresses the temporal scope of immunity ratione personae and whether it 
relates to both official and private acts. The general view within the Commission was the 
immunity only exists while the person holds the office of head of state, head of government, or 
foreign minister, but protects the person with respect to both their private or official acts and 
omissions. The draft article as adopted on first reading reads: 
 
Article 4: Scope of immunity ratione personae 
 
1. Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs enjoy 
immunity ratione personae only during their term of office. 
 
2. Such immunity ratione personae covers all acts performed, whether in a private or 
official capacity, by Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs during or prior to their term of office. 
 
                                                          
37 International Law Commission, Memorandum by the Secretariat on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596, at 74–79, paras. 114–117, 121 (Mar. 31, 2008). 
38 Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304–05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1988). 
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3. The cessation of immunity ratione personae is without prejudice to the application of 
the rules of international law concerning immunity ratione materiae.39 
 
Though in most instances the temporal requirement will be clear, the draft article and 
commentary do not address certain issues, such as the effect upon existing proceedings of a 
person who transitions into or out of a high-level office. Thus, if a person is indicted and an 
arrest warrant is issued before she becomes president, is she immune from such proceedings after 
she becomes president? Conversely, if a person is indicted and an arrest warrant is issued while 
she is president, and the proceeding is stayed, does she remain immune from that indictment 
after she leaves office? In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court ordered Belgium to 
cancel the arrest warrant that it issued during the time the foreign minister was in office, even 
though at the time of the Court’s order that person was no longer foreign minister.40 The Court’s 
position was that the issuance of the warrant constituted a violation of Belgium’s obligation 
towards the D.R.C. and remained so even after the minister left office. 
 Thus, the Commission provisionally adopted three draft articles and agreed to consider 
the draft article on definitions on a rolling basis. The Commission will await the special 
rapporteur’s subsequent reports, in which she will explore immunity ratione materiae, possible 
exceptions to immunity, and procedural matters, with associated draft articles. To that end, the 
Commission has requested information from States “on the practice of their institutions, and in 
particular, on judicial decisions, with reference to the meaning given to the phrases ‘official acts’ 
                                                          
39 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 66, para. 49. 
40 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 26, para. 76. 
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and ‘acts performed in an official capacity’ in the context of the immunity of State officials from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction.” 41  
The issue of exceptions may prove contentious. One exception clearly exists; either 
immunity ratione personae or ratione materiae may be waived for a given case by the 
government of the official.42 Whether further exceptions will be accepted by the Commission is 
unclear, as is whether, if they are accepted, they will be regarded as progressive development of 
the law. The overall objective to avoid impunity for atrocity crimes is apparent, but so is the 
desire to allow for the peaceful conduct of international relations between senior governmental 
officials and to avoid spurious allegations before national courts driven more by politics than 
facts. The Arrest Warrant judgment found that customary international law provided immunity 
before national courts for a sitting foreign minister–and a fortiori for heads of state and 
government–even with respect to alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.43 Other 
international jurisprudence may prove relevant as well, such as the International Criminal 
Court’s 2011 decision regarding Malawi’s failure to arrest and surrender Sudan’s President. The 
relevant portion of that decision indicates that immunity ratione personae under customary law 
fully operates within national law with respect to national prosecutions, even in the context of 
serious international crimes.44 Likewise, in the Charles Taylor case, the Appeals Chamber of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone made the same distinction between the non-availability of 
immunity from prosecution before international courts and its availability with respect to 
                                                          
41 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 8, para. 25. 
42 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 26, para. 61. 
43 Id. at para. 58. 
44 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. CC-02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of 
the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the 
Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, paras. 22–43 (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1287184.pdf (affirming that immunity ratione personae exists with respect to 
prosecution for serious crimes in national courts, as contrasted with its unavailability with respect to arrest and 
surrender of a person suspected of such crimes to an international criminal tribunal). 
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prosecution before national courts.45 In several cases before national courts, including that 
involving former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet,46 the lack of immunity turned not on the 
nature of the crime, but on other issues, such as the existence of a multilateral treaty adhered to 
by the relevant states with respect to the relevant atrocity. 
 
II.   OTHER TOPICS 
  
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties 
 
 Previously addressed by an ILC study group under the broader designation “treaties over 
time,” this topic was refined and renamed in 2012 and assigned to Georg Nolte (Germany) as 
special rapporteur.47 Nolte submitted his first report on this topic for the sixty-fifth session,48 
which led to the provisional adoption by the Commission of five draft conclusions.  
 Draft conclusion 1 situates the topic within the rules on treaty interpretation set forth in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).49 It reads: 
  
Conclusion 1: General rule and means of treaty interpretation 
 
                                                          
45 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case Number SCSL-2003-0l-AR72(E), Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, paras 51-52 (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber May 31, 2004). 
46 Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999] UKHL 
17, [2000] AC 147 (appeal taken from Eng.), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 581 (1999). 
47 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 176. 
48 International Law Commission, First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to 
Treaty Interpretation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/660, at 4–5, para. 6 (2013) (prepared by special rapporteur Georg Nolte) 
[hereinafter First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice]. 
49 See VCLT, supra note 19. 
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1.  Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth, 
respectively, the general rule of interpretation and the rule on supplementary means of 
interpretation. These rules also apply as customary international law. 
 
2.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
3.  Article 31, paragraph 3, provides, inter alia, that there shall be taken into account, 
together with the context, (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; and (b) any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation. 
 
4.  Recourse may be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
as a supplementary means of interpretation under article 32. 
 
5.  The interpretation of a treaty consists of a single combined operation, which 
places appropriate emphasis on the various means of interpretation indicated, 
respectively, in articles 31 and 32.50 
 
Notably, paragraph 1 confirms the status of Articles 31 and 32 as customary international law, 
but does not address whether Article 33 (on interpretation of treaties authenticated in more than 
one language), in whole or in part, also reflects customary international law. Mixed views 
                                                          
50 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 13, para. 39. 
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emerged within the Commission regarding the status of provisions set forth in Article 33, 
including whether addressing the matter was pertinent to this particular topic. Paragraphs 1, 3, 
and 4 stress the difference between Articles 31 and 32; subsequent practice and agreement falling 
within Article 31 “shall be taken into account,” while all other subsequent practice may fall 
within the supplementary means of interpretation to which “recourse may be had” under Article 
32. That distinction also animates draft conclusion 2, which reads: 
 
Conclusion 2: Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice as authentic means of 
interpretation 
 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) and (b), being 
objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty, are 
authentic means of interpretation, in the application of the general rule of treaty 
interpretation reflected in article 31. 51 
 
The term “authentic means of interpretation” does not appear in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, but was used by the Commission in 1966 to characterize the means identified in 
Article 31.52 Though the distinction between Articles 31 and 32 exists, the Commission also 
stressed in paragraph 5 of conclusion 1 that the interpretation of a treaty consists of “a single 
combined operation” – a phrase also used by the Commission in 1966 when discussing these 
rules.53  
                                                          
51 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 20, para. 39. 
52 [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 187, 218–23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 
Draft Articles]. 
53 Id. at 219. 
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In some circumstances, a treaty contains an open-textured term, such as “commercial,”54  
which might be understood to encompass different meanings over time. In such circumstances, 
the subsequent agreement and subsequent practice of states may be especially helpful in 
understanding the meaning to be given the term. The special rapporteur wished to identify this 
particular use of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice, and thus draft conclusion 3 
reads: 
 
Conclusion 3: Interpretation of treaty terms as capable of evolving over time 
 
Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may assist in 
determining whether or not the presumed intention of the parties upon the conclusion of 
the treaty was to give a term used a meaning which is capable of evolving over time. 55 
 
The commentary makes clear that there is no a priori assumption of a term as either 
evolving or not; in any given instance, it may be that subsequent agreement or practice helps 
establish that the term is static rather than evolving.56 Ultimately, this particular conclusion 
might be better situated further along in the list of conclusions since broader, systemic issues are 
addressed in draft conclusions 4 and 5.   
Draft conclusion 4 defines what is meant by subsequent agreement and subsequent 
practice as follows: 
 
                                                          
54 See Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 213, para. 
66 (July 13). 
55 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 24, para. 39. 
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Conclusion 4: Definition of subsequent agreement and subsequent practice 
 
1.  A “subsequent agreement” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31 
(3) (a) is an agreement between the parties, reached after the conclusion of a treaty, 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. 
 
2.  A “subsequent practice” as an authentic means of interpretation under article 31 
(3)(b) consists of conduct in the application of a treaty, after its conclusion, which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. 
 
3.  Other “subsequent practice” as a supplementary means of interpretation under 
article 32 consists of conduct by one or more parties in the application of the treaty, after 
its conclusion. 
 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 are lifted almost verbatim from Article 31(3); the added references to 
“after the conclusion of a treaty” indicate that the relevant practice/agreement may date from the 
time the text of a treaty is adopted or made definite.57 The language of paragraph 3 is not based 
on the VCLT because subsequent practice is not specifically mentioned as a supplementary 
means of interpretation. Nevertheless, the commentary identifies numerous cases before 
international tribunals and courts where subsequent practice not falling within Article 31(3)(b) 
was used in the process of treaty interpretation.58 
                                                          
57 Id. at 31, para. 39. 
58 Id. at 37–41, para. 39. 
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Draft conclusion 5 focuses on the issue of attribution of conduct to a state when 
analyzing subsequent agreement and practice. It reads: 
 
Conclusion 5: Attribution of subsequent practice 
 
1.  Subsequent practice under articles 31 and 32 may consist of any conduct in the 
application of a treaty which is attributable to a party to the treaty under international law. 
 
2.  Other conduct, including by non-State actors, does not constitute subsequent 
practice under articles 31 and 32. Such conduct may, however, be relevant when 
assessing the subsequent practice of parties to a treaty.59 
 
The debate within the Commission on the fifth conclusion encompassed divergent views; 
some members believed there needed to be a different definition for “attribution” in the treaty 
interpretation context; others saw no discrepancy between this context and that of state 
responsibility; still others questioned the wisdom and necessity of addressing attribution at all. 
The language eventually adopted is meant to indicate that all subsequent conduct attributable 
under the rules of state responsibility is potentially relevant to treaty interpretation; hence, “may” 
consist of any conduct.60 A paragraph following the present first paragraph—eventually 
removed—would have differentiated between the practice of “higher” State organs and “lower” 
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19 
 
19 
 
State organs, but such a distinction was regarded as problematic since the conduct of lower 
authorities may in certain circumstances be relevant.61  
 The special rapporteur plans to submit a second report in 2014, a third report in 2015, and 
a final report, with revised conclusions and commentaries, in 2016.62 
 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 
 
 The Commission is close to completing its first reading on this topic, which consists of a 
series of draft articles setting forth rules applicable to a state in which a disaster occurs and to 
those states or non-state actors that are in a position to provide assistance. “Disaster” for this 
purpose is defined in draft article 3 as a “calamitous event or series of events resulting in 
widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale material or 
environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society”.63 
As of 2012, eleven draft articles had been adopted on this topic, addressing matters such 
as the duty and forms of cooperation and offers of assistance. 64 At the very start of the sixty-fifth 
session, the Commission adopted five further draft articles on this topic, draft articles 12 through 
15 and 5bis, which had been presented, discussed, and re-drafted but not adopted during the 
sixty-fourth session.65 These draft articles further developed the rules governing external 
assistance, which were introduced in draft articles 10 and 11, addressing respectively the duty of 
a state to seek assistance when faced with a disaster that exceeds the state’s national response 
capacity and affirming that the affected state’s consent is required before the provision of 
                                                          
61 Id. at 42–43, para. 39. 
62  First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice, supra note 48, at 56, para. 145. 
63 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 73, para. 61. 
64 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 168-69. 
65 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 73, para. 59. 
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external assistance.66 Draft article 12 provides that states, the United Nations, other 
intergovernmental organizations, and relevant non-governmental organizations “have the right to 
offer assistance to the affected states”, while relevant non-governmental organizations “may also 
offer assistance”.67 Draft article 13 recognizes that the affected state may impose conditions on 
the provision of external assistance, but only in accordance with the draft articles, international 
law, and the national law of the affected State.68 Draft article 14 indicates that the affected state 
shall facilitate the prompt, effective provision of external assistance by taking necessary 
measures within its national laws.69 Draft article 15 addresses the termination of external 
assistance, requiring appropriate advance notification.70 Lastly, draft article 5 bis further 
elaborates the principle of cooperation introduced in draft article 5 by providing examples of the 
types of activities that are to be included in “cooperation”, specifically “humanitarian assistance, 
coordination of international relief actions and communications, and making available relief 
equipment and supplies, and scientific medical and technical resources.”71 
Following the adoption of these five draft articles, the Commission turned to the sixth 
report of the special rapporteur, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Colombia), which focused on the 
responsibility of states to reduce the risk of disasters.72 After discussion in both the plenary and 
the drafting committee, the Commission adopted draft article 16, which provides: 
 
Article 16:  Duty to reduce the risk of disasters 
                                                          
66 Id. at 74, para. 61. 
67 Id. at 79, para. 62. 
68 Id. at 80, para. 62. 
69 Id. at 83, para. 62. 
70 Id. at 85, para. 62. 
71 Id. at 76, para. 62. 
72 International Law Commission, Sixth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/662, (May 3, 2013) (prepared by special rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina) [hereinafter Sixth Report on 
the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters]. 
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 1.  Each State shall reduce the risk of disasters by taking the necessary and 
appropriate measures, including through legislation and regulations, to prevent, mitigate, 
and prepare for disasters. 
 
 2.  Disaster risk reduction measures include the conduct of risk assessments, the 
collection and dissemination of risk and past loss information, and the installation and 
operation of early warning systems.73 
 
The obligation identified is to “reduce” rather than “prevent” disasters, and is to be 
accomplished through measures that seek to prevent, mitigate, and prepare.74 The Commission 
relied on a variety of sources of law in order to identify this duty to reduce the risk of disasters, 
including international agreements and instruments (such as the 2005 Hyogo Framework for 
Action),75 regional court decisions (such as the European Court of Human Rights decisions in 
Öneryildiz v. Turkey and Budayeva and Others v. Russia),76 and numerous national laws on 
prevention, preparation, and mitigation.77 As indicated in the commentary thereto, the 
Commission sought to emphasize that while states have a concrete obligation to reduce the risk 
of disasters, the dimensions of this obligation are different for each state, in particular due to 
resource constraints and legislative or regulatory structure.78 A further draft Article 5 ter extends 
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77 Id. at 87-88, para. 62. 
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the principle of cooperation introduced in draft article 5 to include cooperation with respect to 
the reduction of disasters.79  
 
Identification of Customary International Law 
 
 This topic was added to the current program of work in 2012 and placed under the 
stewardship of Michael Wood (United Kingdom) as special rapporteur.80 Wood’s first report81 
for the Commission’s sixty-fifth session was introductory in nature, noting that the aim of the 
topic is to “offer some guidance to those called upon to apply rules of customary international 
law on how to identify such rules in concrete cases”,82 which will require the Commission to 
“consider both the requirements for the formation of a rule of customary international law, and 
the types of evidence that establish the fulfilment of those requirements.”83 The report generally 
addressed customary international law as a source of international law, indicated the types of 
materials (notably ICJ cases) that would assist in analyzing the topic, and surveyed the ample 
literature on the topic.  
 Three decisions were taken by the Commission that bear mention. First, there was 
agreement within the Commission that Wood should proceed to develop “a set of conclusions 
with commentaries, a practical outcome which would serve as a guide to lawyers and judges who 
are not experts in public international law.”84 Second, the original title of the topic (“formation 
and evidence of customary international law”) was changed to “identification of customary 
                                                          
79 Id. at 78, para. 62. 
80 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 174. 
81 International Law Commission, First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/663, at 3, para. 6 (2013) (prepared by special rapporteur Sir Michael Wood) [hereinafter First Report 
on Identification of Customary International Law]. 
82 Id. at 6, para. 14. 
83 Id. at 6–7, para. 15. 
84 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 95, para. 73, and at 99, para. 101. 
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international law” in response to various concerns, including the difficulty of translating 
“evidence” in this context in different languages. Even so, it was agreed that “it remained 
important to include both the formation and evidence of customary international law within the 
topic.”85 Third, the Commission was in general agreement that jus cogens would not be directly 
dealt with as a part of the topic, though the concept may be referenced as the need arose.86  
 In 2014, Wood plans on submitting a second report that will examine the two elements of 
customary international law—state practice and opinio juris—and the relationship between them, 
as well as the effects of treaties on custom and the role played by international organizations. To 
that end, the Commission has requested information from states “on their practice relating to the 
formation of customary law and the types of evidence suitable for establishing such law in a 
given situation, as set out in: (a) official statements before legislatures, courts, and international 
organizations; and (b) decisions of national, regional and subregional courts.”87 A third report in 
2015 will address more specific aspects, such as the “persistent objector” rule, and “special” or 
“regional” customary international law. Wood hopes to submit a final report in 2016 containing a 
full set of conclusions and commentary for adoption by the Commission. 88 
 
Provisional Application of Treaties 
 
 At the sixty-fourth session, the Commission added the topic “provisional application of 
treaties” to its current programme of work and appointed Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo (Mexico) 
                                                          
85 Id. at 95, para. 76; see also id. at 100, para. 106. In French, the title will be “La détermination du droit 
international coutumier”. 
86 Id. at 96, para. 78, and at 99, para. 103.  
87 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 8. 
88 First Report on Identification of Customary International Law, supra note 81, at 76, para. 102. 
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as special rapporteur.89 Gómez-Robledo submitted a short first report on the topic for the sixty-
fifth session, which sought to identify on a general level “the principal legal issues that arise in 
the context of the provisional application of treaties”.90 Certain language within the report 
prompted some members to express concern that the Commission not be seen as promoting the 
use of provisional application by states, given that doing so might circumvent established 
national legal procedures for adherence to treaties.91 Rather, the objective was to accept the 
phenomenon of the resort by states to provisional application and to examine its legal 
parameters. That concern prompted some members to suggest studying the national procedures 
of states, but it was generally understood that the project was concerned with the relevant rules 
of international law (not national law), including those set forth in VCLT Article 25. Several 
members identified the central value of the project as determining the legal effect of provisional 
application, which in their view gave rise to a binding legal obligation (through typically subject 
to a readily-available ability to terminate the obligation).92  
 Gómez-Robledo has indicated a preference for developing a set of guidelines with 
commentaries as the outcome of the Commission’s work on the topic.93 To assist in its work, the 
Commission has requested information from states on their practice concerning provisional 
application, especially with respect to the decision to apply a treaty provisionally, the termination 
of such provisional application, and the legal effects of provisional application. 94 
 
Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) 
                                                          
89 2012 Report, supra note 2, at 105, paras. 140–41; see Murphy, supra note 2, at 171–73. 
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Launched in 2005, this topic for the past two years has been addressed within a working 
group under the chairmanship of Kriangsak Kittichaisaree (Thailand), rather than under the 
auspices of a special rapporteur.95 During the sixty-fifth session, the working group produced a 
report that summarizes the Commission’s work to date, including the initial reports by a special 
rapporteur and a detailed memorandum by the secretariat on existing treaty regimes.96 Among 
the findings of the report is that “it would be futile for the Commission to engage in harmonizing 
the various treaty clauses on the obligation to extradite or prosecute,”97 but “that there are 
important gaps in the present conventional regime … which may need to be closed”, including 
with respect to crimes against humanity.98 The report also analyzed the International Court of 
Justice’s recent decision in the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute case,99 where the Court 
identified several important aspects of the aut dedere aut judicare provisions of the Convention 
against Torture100—principles that likely have significance beyond just that treaty. Among other 
things, the Court’s decision addressed in some detail a state’s obligations to establish the 
necessary jurisdiction, to exercise promptly that jurisdiction when an offender is present, to 
investigate, and to submit the matter to prosecution or extradite.101  
 
The Most-Favored-Nation Clause 
 
                                                          
95 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 174–76. 
96 2013 Report, supra note 1, at 125, Annex A. 
97 Id. at 132, para. 18. 
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 Since its inception in 2008, the topic on “the most-favored-nation clause” has been 
addressed within a study group.102 That group was reconstituted for the sixty-fifth session under 
the chairmanship of Donald M. McRae (Canada), although Mathias Forteau (France) served as 
chair in McRae’s absence.103 The study group considered working papers by Shinya Murase 
(Japan) and Mahmoud Hmoud (Jordan), as well as two recent arbitration awards that considered 
the “Maffezini problem” of whether MFN clauses allow for importation of dispute resolution 
provisions from other treaties.104 It is expected that the study group will begin consideration of a 
draft final report at the Commission’s session in 2014, which will address the following issues: 
the origins and purpose of the work of the study group; the Commission’s 1978 draft articles on 
MFN clauses and their relevance; subsequent developments since 1978; the contemporary 
relevance of MFN clauses; the consideration of MFN provisions in bodies such as UNCTAD and 
OECD; contextual considerations, such as the application of MFN clauses before “mixed” 
(investor/state) arbitrations; and conflicting approaches to the interpretation of the MFN 
provisions in the case law.105 The study group report might include guidelines or model clauses, 
but might instead simply analyze state practice regarding the writing of MFN clauses and the 
interpretation that tribunals have given those various provisions.106 
 
Protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts 
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 During its sixty-third session, the Commission added the topic “protection of the 
environment in relation to armed conflicts” to the long-term work program.107 During the sixty-
fifth session, the Commission moved the topic to its current program of work and appointed 
Marie Jacobsson (Sweden) as the special rapporteur.108 Jacobsson then held informal 
consultations regarding the scope, methodology, and possible final outcome of the Commission’s 
work on the topic in preparation for the development of her first report.109  
Jacobsson has in mind three stages for the project which might be characterized as 
“temporal” in nature. A first report in 2014 will address the obligations of states in the pre-
conflict period with respect to protection of the environment (such as inclusion of relevant 
materials in military manuals), as well as “peacetime” obligations that may remain relevant in 
times of armed conflict. A second report in 2015 will address relevant obligations that arise 
under the law of armed conflict, both international and non-international. A third report in 2016 
will address obligations that may exist in the post-conflict period, such as with respect to 
reparations or reconstruction.110  To assist in these reports, the Commission has requested 
information from States “on whether, in their practice, international or domestic environmental 
law has been interpreted as applicable in relation to international or non-international armed 
conflict.”111 The final product of this project is not yet clear, but the special rapporteur has in 
mind the development of non-binding draft guidelines.112  
 
Protection of the Atmosphere 
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 On the final day of the sixty-fifth session, the Commission decided to move the topic 
“protection of the atmosphere” from the long-term to the current work program, and to appoint 
Shinya Murase (Japan) as special rapporteur.113 Concern that the Commission’s work on the 
topic not address matters that could have adverse effects either for existing treaty regimes or for 
ongoing negotiations resulted in a decision by the Commission that the topic would be 
significantly limited in scope. That decision provided: 
 
(a) Work on the topic will proceed in a manner so as not to interfere with relevant 
political negotiations, including on climate change, ozone depletion, and long-range 
transboundary air pollution. The topic will not deal with, but is also without prejudice to, 
questions such as: liability of States and their nationals, the polluter-pays principle, the 
precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibilities, and the transfer of 
funds and technology to developing countries, including intellectual property rights; 
 
(b) The topic will also not deal with specific substances, such as black carbon, 
tropospheric ozone, and other dual-impact substances, which are the subject of 
negotiations among States. The project will not seek to “fill” gaps in the treaty regimes; 
 
(c) Questions relating to outer space, including its delimitation, are not part of the topic; 
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(d) The outcome of the work on the topic will be draft guidelines that do not seek to 
impose on current treaty regimes legal rules or legal principles not already contained 
therein. 
 
The Special Rapporteur’s reports would be based on such understanding.114 
 
 Murase will now proceed to develop his first report on the topic, which may be informed 
by draft articles and commentary by an International Law Association Committee on “The Legal 
Principles Relating to Climate Change,” which is scheduled to complete its work (under the 
chairmanship of Murase) in 2014.115 
 
Other Issues 
 
 In the course of the sixty-fifth session, the Commission added the topic crimes against 
humanity to its long-term work program.116 The objective in pursuing that topic would be to 
draft a convention addressing the obligation of a state party to criminalize crimes against 
humanity under its national laws and to exercise jurisdiction over offenders who turn up in its 
territory, even when the crime is committed abroad by and against non-nationals. Further, unlike 
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,117 the convention would address inter-
state obligations with respect to the crime, including aut dedere aut judicare and the provision of 
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mutual legal assistance.118 Crimes against humanity thus joins several topics on the 
Commission’s long-term work program.119 
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